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1. Introduction.  Are there limits to scientific explanation?  This question can be understood in at least two ways.  If we take the question to mean ‘Is there anything science will never be able to explain?’, then the answer is vexed at best.  It is not clear that there is a well-posed question in the neighborhood, since it may presuppose something akin to a convergent final science—a contestable supposition.  However, this question can also be interpreted as: ‘Are there explanations that scientists do not accept—even though such explanations do not contradict the content of any scientific theories?’  The answer to that question, I shall argue, is yes.  Under certain circumstances, scientists reject an attempt to explain an accepted part of the scientific corpus, even though the proposed explanation does not conflict directly with experimental results or contemporary theory.  I will present and discuss several cases, current and historical, in which scientists do not accept such explanations. 
	This paper has two objectives.  First, I present a general characterization of one type of explanation that scientists are unwilling to accept, supporting this characterization with historical and contemporary examples.  Second, I argue that the version of scientific realism that appears in a prominent version of the ‘no-miracles’ argument (NMA) is an instance of this type of unacceptable explanations.  (This version of realism holds that “theories accepted in a mature science are typically approximately true” (Putnam 1975, 73).)  Therefore, if one accepts the form of naturalism expounded by most leading proponents of the NMA (e.g. Putnam, Boyd, Psillos), in which philosophers of science are entitled to all and only the methods of inquiry used by practicing scientists, then philosophers of science should not accept scientific realism on the basis of the NMA.  The argument can be summarized as follows:
(P1) Scientists do not accept explanans-statements that neither generate new predictions nor unify apparently disparate claims.
(P2) Scientific realism (as it appears in the NMA) generates no new predictions and does not unify any apparently disparate claims.  
(P3) Naturalistic philosophers of science “should employ no methods other than those used by the scientists themselves” (Psillos 1999, 78). 						
 	Naturalistic philosophers of science should not accept scientific realism (as it appears in the NMA).
Section 2 presents evidence in favor of (P1), section 3 defends it from objections, and section 4 argues for (P2).  The conclusion examines how the above argument, if correct, affects the wider landscape of the scientific realism debates—including which versions of realism this argument does not affect.

2. Where are the boundaries of legitimate scientific explanation?
	In order to provide a naturalistic account of the limits of scientific explanation, we must examine various explanations that scientists decline to accept, relative to a given body of scientific knowledge at a given time.  Relativizing to current background knowledge is necessary, since what is inexplicable today has the potential to be explained by tomorrow’s experimental or theoretical discoveries (for example, compare the status of the atomic hypothesis in Epicurus’ time to the period following Einstein’s explanation of Brownian motion).  Some attempted explanations are rejected because the explanans, considered in conjunction with the relevant initial conditions and background knowledge, persistently leads to conflict with robust experimental results.  Other proposed explanations are not accepted because they are inconsistent, in letter or spirit, with other currently accepted scientific claims, or even with the canons of logic.  Yet other explanations are not accepted because a simpler alternative explanans is available that can account equally well (whatever that may mean) for the same explananda.  For present purposes, let us bracket explanations with these sorts of faults.  
There are explanations that do not suffer from these defects, yet are nonetheless not accepted by scientists.  I do not have a complete list of all such unacceptable types of explanations, but the following captures one: 
(P1) Scientists (usually)​[1]​ do not accept explanations whose explanans-claims (relative to available background knowledge) (i) generate no new predictions and​[2]​ (ii) do not unify apparently disparate established claims. 
  
What is the relationship between (i) and (ii)?  According to one common view of unification, (i) could be an instance of (ii): “A consilience of inductions [i.e., unification] is said to occur when an hypothesis or theory… can predict cases that are different from those the hypothesis was designed to explain/predict, or when it can predict/explain unexpected phenomena” (Morrison 1990, 322; my emphasis).  For present purposes, it is immaterial whether we view the generation of new predictive content by an explanans as an instance of a unifying explanans or not.  The content of (P1) can probably best be understood by considering a concrete example.  Virtus dormativa explanations, which are nearly universally rejected, meet the description of unacceptable explanations outlined in (P1). Suppose it is an accepted fact that opium tends to put people to sleep.  ‘Explaining’ this fact by postulating a dormative virtue in the opium generates no new predictions, over and above the predictions that can be made from the explanandum (‘Opium puts people to sleep’) alone.  Additionally, this explanans unifies no facts that are not already unified by the explanandum.
Note that the two claims ‘Opium makes John sleepy’ and ‘Opium makes Jane sleepy’ are already unified by the claim ‘Opium makes people sleepy’ (if they are unified at all); they are not unified any further by postulating the existence of a dormative virtue in the opium.  This contrasts sharply with Newton’s claim that a universal attractive force inheres in every material body in the universe, a claim which explains not only the observed motions of the planets around the sun, but also the behavior of freely falling bodies near the Earth’s surface, the paths of comets, and the rising and falling of the tides.  One might object that the real problem with virtus dormativa-style explanations is not that they explain only one previously established fact, but that they are in some sense fundamentally circular and therefore vacuous (among other potential problems).  I appreciate the force of this complaint—though the unacceptability of virtus dormativa explanations may well be overdetermined.  Therefore, the remainder of this section adduces patently non-circular examples in support of (P1), for those not already inclined to accept it.  And many people probably are inclined to accept (P1) without further argument—for it captures the widely-held idea that any acceptable scientific hypothesis should enjoy some independent confirmation over and above a single piece of evidence the inquirer had in view when first devising the hypothesis.​[3]​

2.1. Driesch’s vitalism  
One example of an unacceptable explanation that supports (P1) comes from the scientists who argued for the existence of some sort of vital force in animals from the 18th to the early 20th centuries.  There were certain facts of organic development that did not appear to be amenable to explanation in mechanical, physico-chemical terms.  For example, Hans Driesch, working at the turn of the 20th century, discovered that sea urchin embryos that were halved at a very early stage of development could still generate two normally proportioned (though somewhat smaller) adult urchins.  He later discovered that other organisms, such as water hydrae, had similar abilities to develop into normal adult forms even when the cells of the early forms were perturbed in various ways.  In order to explain his observations of the sea urchin and other organisms, he introduced the concept of an entelechy: a non-physico-chemical causal factor that directs the overall development of the organism from a simple zygote into a complex adult that forms an integrated whole.  Driesch characterizes an entelechy as “the relation of localities in the absolutely normal case” of the organism (1929, 91).  After presenting his sea urchin findings, Driesch writes that “we are required to accept a new kind of elementary… process, because no machine produced by physical and chemical means can be contrived as the basis for the events in question” (Driesch 1899, quoted in Sander 1992, 3).  Driesch thinks no such machine is possible, because “a machine… cannot remain itself if you remove parts of it or rearrange its parts at will” (1929, 104).  Put simply, a dishwasher that has been halved cannot still function as a dishwasher, and Driesch claims that the same principle holds for any machine; thus, he concludes, the developing embryo cannot be a machine.  
For Driesch, as the first of the above quotations indicates, the entelechy’s existence is justified on the grounds of its apparent explanatory power: such an entity guiding development would explain facts that were previously unexplained and/or considered inexplicable.  In “natural science,” Driesch claims, “something new and elemental must always be introduced whenever what is known of other elemental facts is proved to be unable to explain the facts in a new field of investigation” (1929, 105). Despite the fact that the vitalist hypothesis explained these otherwise unexplained facts, most of Driesch’s contemporaries did not accept his hypothesis (Sander 1992, 1993), and far more current scientists would reject the introduction of entelechies—despite the fact that there are still unexplained developmental facts today.  Driesch’s critics observed that introducing entelechies into the scientific account of embryonic development did not generate any new testable claims, and Driesch agreed (Jennings 1912, 435).  Furthermore, positing a specific entelechy for each species does not unify apparently disparate facts. First, each species requires its own specific entelechy—that is, we must posit as many distinct entelechies as there are species of organisms.  Second, the claims ‘Sea urchins can develop normally when dismembered at an early stage of development’ and ‘Hydrae can develop normally when dismembered at an early stage of development’ are unified by the inductive generalization that ‘Many (or all) organisms can develop normally if dismembered at an early stage of development.’  There is no further unification added by the claim that each organism has an entelechy that regulates its development.  This is analogous to the virtus dormativa case, in which the inductive generalization Opium makes everyone sleepy unifies the two facts that opium makes John sleepy and makes Jane sleepy—but these two facts are not further unified by postulating a virtus dormativa in the opium.  Of course, if further assumptions were made about the manner in which an entelechy or a virtus dormativa functions, it is conceivable that new predictions could be generated or distinct sets of phenomena unified—however, without such further assumptions, I submit that scientists would be unwilling to accept explanations involving an entelechy or a virtus dormativa.

2.2. Kepler’s astronomical model of nested Platonic solids
The centerpiece of Kepler’s Mysterium Cosmographicum provides another example of an explanation that is both unacceptable and explains only one already accepted fact.  In the preface, Kepler writes: “There were three things in particular, about which I persistently sought the reasons why they were such and not otherwise: the number, the size, and the motions of the heavenly spheres” ([1596] 1981, 63).  That is, Kepler wants to explain why there were exactly six [sic] planets (instead of five, or seven, or…), and why the distances between the planets are what they are (instead of more or less).  To explain why there are six planets, he appeals to the five perfect (or Platonic) solids: if these five were nested one inside the other, and there were globes in between each as well as inside the innermost solid and outside the outermost, there would be one globe for each of the six planets’ (average) orbital paths.  And if the solids are ordered properly, the distance between the planets’ orbits approximately matches the distance between these globes.  These two explanations are not ones that scientists in Kepler’s time were (for the most part) willing to accept (Caspar [1950] 1959, 69-71)—or, for that matter, in our own time.  Each explanans-parameter explains exactly one previously accepted fact: correlating the five Platonic solids to six planetary orbs explains nothing more than why there are six planets, and the particular ordering of the nested solids explains nothing but the previously known (approximate) distances between the planets.  Neither explanans generates new experimental predictions, and neither unifies apparently disparate realms of previously accepted facts.​[4]​

2.3. ‘Just-so’ evolutionary stories
	Another type of explanation that scientists do not accept is the ‘just-so story’ about the evolutionary histories of traits observed today.  Critics of adaptationism claim that adaptationists’ explanations of current traits are just-so stories (most famously in (Gould and Lewontin 1978)), whereas adaptationists claim that this characterization is an unfair caricature of their work.  Whether adaptationists’ work actually resembles just-so stories enough to condemn it is irrelevant for present purposes: both sides to the dispute agree that just-so stories should not be accepted.  A just-so evolutionary story has the following form: from the existence of a certain trait T observed in an organism today, infer that a certain set of selective pressures P that would favor selection of T operated on the organism’s ancestors (Sterelny and Griffiths 1999, 243).  In the caricature version of adaptationism, the only evidence that the selective pressures P existed is that we observe trait T now.  Under those circumstances, selective pressures P constitute an explanation of a single, already-accepted claim (that the organism has observed trait T).
Both adaptationists and their critics agree that, in order for a particular evolutionary explanation to be scientifically acceptable, there must be more evidence for the explanans than merely the current trait it was introduced to explain.   Gould writes:
Not all sociobiology proceeds in the mode of storytelling for individual cases.  It rests on firmer methodological ground when it seeks broad correlations across taxonomic lines, as between reproductive strategy and distribution of resources, for example, or when it can make testable, quantitative predictions. (1978, 531) 
Current evolutionary psychologists are also accused of telling just-so stories.  However, leading evolutionary psychologists, such as Leda Cosmides, hold that their theories are not explanations that explain only one already accepted phenomenon:
the method of evolutionary psychology outlined here… is hypothetico-deductive, rather than speculative.  In a speculative approach, one first discovers a psychological mechanism, and then one speculates about what adaptive problem it evolved to solve.  The approach advocated here is the reverse… It is a constrained and predictive approach, rather than a compilation of post hoc explanations for known phenomena. (1989, 190)
What Cosmides calls the ‘speculative’ method is precisely the kind of explanation I am claiming that scientists reject.  She holds that her theories do stand on what Gould called ‘firmer methodological ground,’ since they make new predictions, and even reveal “previously unknown cognitive features” (Cosmides and Tooby 1995, 91) that are given a unified treatment (instead of being a ‘post hoc compilation’) within her theory. As Elisabeth Lloyd points out (1999, 212), both the adaptationists and their critics agree on what an acceptable explanation looks like in the abstract: it must make new predictions and/or provide a unified account of apparently different phenomena (such as Gould’s ‘broad correlations across taxonomic lines’).  The dispute is, in large part, whether particular adaptationist explanations meet these general methodological standards.  ‘Just-so stories,’ along with vitalism, Kepler’s nested solids model, and virtus dormativa explanations, all illustrate and substantiate (P1): an explanans that explains only a single piece of established data is not considered scientifically acceptable—even if it is the only explanans currently available.  As Lipton (1991) notes, proper abductive reasoning only permits inference to the best explanation when the best is good enough—if our best explanans for some fact fails to meet a minimal threshold for explanatory goodness, abductive reasoners should not accept it.  My claim is that the four cases presented in this section fail to meet this minimal standard.
	Cases of scientifically unacceptable explanations that fit (P1) could be multiplied.  Perhaps Newton’s famous refusal to offer an explanation for the existence of gravity could be understood as motivated by something like (P1).  A prominent recent example of such an unacceptable explanation may be found in so-called Intelligent Design (ID) theory.  We again observe the same pattern seen in Driesch and the others: ID’s proponents point to some widely accepted fact that (purportedly) has not yet been given a satisfactory evolutionary explanation, such as the blood-clotting cascade or the locomotive system of bacterial flagella, and claim that the existence of an intelligent designer who intervened to create the cascade and the motor would explain these previously unexplained facts.  I will not here delve into the details of ID, or other unacceptable explanations that fit the pattern specified in (P1); instead, I turn to three pressing objections to (P1).  

3. Objections and Replies to (P1)
3.1. Examples’ unacceptability misdiagnosed
One might grant that all four of the above attempted explanations are scientifically unacceptable, but object that I have not properly identified the true reasons for their unacceptability.  For example, one could argue that the only reason scientists reject entelechies is that they are non-physical entities that act upon the physical world, and such a form of causation is unintelligible or unscientific—and therefore the standard described in (P1) is irrelevant to scientists’ rejection of entelechies.  This was the explicit, professed rationale of Driesch’s contemporary, Wilhelm Roux, for rejecting the concept of entelechy: “since it is presumed to rule over material structure like a sovereign, this entelechy is not acceptable to exact natural science” (1912, 241).  Similarly, the objector continues, Kepler’s explanation of the number of and distances between the planets is motivated by the assumption that a conscious, beneficent being created the universe.​[5]​  What is fundamentally unacceptable in Kepler’s case, the objector alleges, is the theological motivation and grounding of the nested-solids explanation.  And virtus dormativa explanations, as mentioned above, could be dismissed on the grounds of being somehow covertly circular.  So these cases are problematic because they are unacceptably metaphysical, theological, or circular—not because they qualify under (P1) as unacceptable explanations.
This is a serious objection; I offer two replies.  First, in the case of just-so stories, the hypotheses concerning the environments of our Pleistocene ancestors lack the metaphysics or theology found in Driesch and Kepler.  Thus, even if the objection as stated above is accepted, we can fall back on the just-so stories example to substantiate (P1).  Second, the reason scientists today reject certain theological and metaphysical accounts of phenomena may well be that such accounts generate no new predictive content and fail to unify disparate phenomena genuinely, despite being on the scientific table for 2500 years.​[6]​  If the posit of entelechies could be used to make novel empirical predictions that could not be made without it, then scientists could conceivably accept it, if the predictions were borne out—just as quantum mechanics, with all its counterintuitive strangeness, was accepted several decades ago.  Similarly, any theological hypothesis that did generate new predictive content could be (at least arguably) considered scientific.​[7]​  In short, we may interpret theology and metaphysics as failing to meet scientific standards because they lack both predictive and unifying power.

3.2. Successful ad hoc hypotheses
	One might object to (P1) by pointing to the phenomenon of what could be called ‘successful ad hoc hypotheses.’  When a scientific theory appears to conflict with some piece of data, defenders of the theory often generate an ad hoc hypothesis in order to ‘save’ the theory.  The ad hoc hypothesis is introduced solely to ‘explain away’ the anomalous observation.  In general, scientists cast a disapproving eye upon ad hoc maneuvers; this general disapprobation constitutes good evidence for (P1).  However, in some cases, ad hoc hypotheses are vindicated, and lead to unforeseen discoveries—the hackneyed example of the discovery of Neptune via an apparent violation of Newton’s laws illustrates this point vividly.  LeVerrier and Adams suggested the existence of a planet beyond Uranus, on the grounds that the existence of such a planet would explain exactly one accepted fact: the observed anomalous behavior of Uranus.  Such successful ad hoc hypotheses appear to provide a counter-example to my claim that scientists do not accept explanations that neither make novel predictions nor unify disparate phenomena.  
However, when scientists finally accepted the hypothesis that a planet existed beyond Uranus, it was not solely on the grounds that the Uranus data were anomalous—the later, direct telescopic observation of the new planet triggered the acceptance of the hypothesis.  Thus, the hypothesis of a planet beyond Uranus is not like the three cases above, for it generated new empirical predictions that were later vindicated, and thus does not rest on a single source of evidence, but on two: both the apparent anomalies in Uranus’s behavior, plus the telescopic observations of a planet in the predicted place.  Other successful ad hoc hypotheses will likely have the same structure: although they may be initially introduced in order to account for a single (anomalous) source of evidence, they will be accepted only when they generate new, testable predictions that are independently corroborated by experiment, thereby receiving evidential support from a different source than the original one.

3.3. Self-evidencing explanations
	A final, apparently decisive objection can be drawn from a concept recently discussed by Peter Lipton (1991, 26), which Hempel calls ‘self-evidencing explanations.’  An explanation is “self-evidencing,” Hempel says, “only if, at the time of its presentation, the occurrence of the explanandum event provides the only evidence, or an indispensable part of the only evidence, available in support of some of the explanans-statements” (1965, 372-373).  If such explanations are routinely accepted in science, it appears that that would constitute decisive evidence against (P1).  Hempel claims that we do find such explanations in science, but “an explanation that is self-evidencing may for that reason rest on a poorly supported explanans and may therefore have no strong claim to empirical soundness” (ibid.).  Thus Hempel appears to be agreeing with my primary claim.  However, immediately thereafter, he writes that “even this is not inevitable,” which appears to spell trouble for (P1).  Hempel gives an example of the circumstances under which a self-evidencing explanation would be accepted:
In the case of the absorption spectrum of a star, for example, the previously accepted background information, including the relevant theories, may indicate that the dark lines observed occur only if the specified elements are present in the star’s atmosphere, and then the explanandum, in conjunction with the background information, lends very strong support to the crucial explanatory hypothesis. (Hempel 1965, 373)
If self-evidencing explanations are accepted only under these types of circumstances, then my thesis is safe.  In this case, the background information includes ‘If the detector registers pattern P, then elements E1, … En must be present in the source,’ and the observation we wish to explain is that the detector registers pattern P.  Thus the explanans, ‘Elements E1 … En are present in the source,’ is a deductive consequence of the explanandum and the background assumptions.  The entelechies of Driesch, the nested Platonic solids of Kepler, and just-so evolutionary stories are clearly not deductive consequences of their respective explananda and background theories.  (We should probably also allow an explanation to count as self-evidencing when the background assumptions include probabilistic claims; in the above example, this would amount to something like ‘In 99% of the cases in which the detector registers pattern P, elements E1…En are present in the source.’  But entelechies etc. fare no better on this probabilistic standard.)

4. Application to the realism debate.  The previous sections argued that scientists do not accept certain types of explanations.  The project of delineating acceptable explanations from unacceptable ones is important in its own right; however, in the present section, the lessons of the previous sections will be applied to a philosophical case.  I aim to show that the no-miracles argument for scientific realism relies upon an explanation of exactly the sort described above that scientists do not accept.​[8]​  

4.1.  The no-miracles argument
The NMA is, according to many of its prominent defenders, an instance of inference to the best explanation (IBE), also known as abductive inference.​[9]​  The basic form of abductive inference is: 




How is the NMA supposed to instantiate this schema?  The target explanandum (p above) is, in Psillos’ words, “the overall empirical success of science” (1999, 71), i.e., the claim that mature scientific theories make many accurate observable predictions (in alternative formulations, they are ‘empirically adequate,’ or ‘instrumentally successful’).​[10]​  The proponent of the NMA claims that the empirical success of mature theories is best explained by the truth or approximate truth of such theories (and, in some versions, also by such theories’ theoretical terms successfully referring).  The claim that mature scientific theories are approximately true is, for proponents of the NMA, the thesis of scientific realism—or at least an indispensable component of that thesis.  Then, because IBE licenses the inference from a fact to the best explanation of that fact, the proponent of the NMA infers scientific realism from the mature sciences’ empirical success. The inference can be cast, following the schema above, as follows:
(1)	The (approximate) truth of mature scientific theories is the best explanation of their empirical success.
(2)	Mature scientific theories are empirically successful.				
	Mature scientific theories are (approximately) true.
This account of the NMA closely follows (Psillos 1999, 71).  Let us call the conclusion of this argument ‘scientific realism.’
	However, pinning down the meaning of ‘mature’ in the statement of scientific realism can create difficulties.​[11]​  ‘Mature’ cannot mean ‘empirically successful,’ because then the explanandum of the NMA becomes the tautologous ‘Empirically successful theories are empirically successful,’ and tautologies do not require explanation.  And ‘mature’ presumably cannot merely be shorthand for a list of particular theories current scientists find praiseworthy, for the particle physics of the next century will presumably count as a mature scientific theory too, even if it is as different as quantum mechanics is from its classical counterpart.  Perhaps the best gloss of ‘mature scientific theories’ is semi-ostensive: ‘These theories (pointing to general relativity, evolutionary biology, etc.), and those relevantly similar to them.’  Or, if one truly despairs of finding a useful, non-circular gloss of ‘mature,’ one could give up on this formulation of realism entirely, and search for another, which does not crucially rely upon the notion of a science’s maturity.
Part of the appeal of the NMA, for its proponents, is that it is supposedly part of a thoroughly naturalistic philosophy of science, where ‘naturalism’ is the view that “the epistemology of science should employ no methods other than those used by the scientists themselves” (Psillos 1999, 73).  Similarly, Boyd writes: “[t]he epistemology of empirical science is an empirical science” (1989, 13).  On this view, the philosopher who argues for scientific realism via the NMA is using the same methods and epistemological standards as a scientist who uses inference to the best explanation to infer the existence of a new type of fundamental particle.  Doppelt puts the point clearly: “Explanationists [= proponents of the NMA] adopt a naturalistic stance in epistemology and claim that their scientific realism is a scientific hypothesis justified by the very sort of abductive inference (IBE) effectively employed by scientists in producing knowledge” (2005, 1079).  Since science is rife with abductive inference, Putnam claims that scientific realism is “viewed… as part of the only scientific explanation of the success of science, and hence as part of any adequate description of science and its relations to its objects” (1975, 73, my italics).  Boyd articulates a similar view: “the scientific realist’s abductive argument” is “the only scientifically plausible explanation for the reliability of a scientific methodology which is so theory-dependent” (1989, 9, my italics; see also 1980, 622).  However, the type of explanation that the NMA uses to explain the empirical success of science is exactly the kind of explanation, discussed in section 2, that scientists do not accept; that is, realism neither makes new predictions nor unifies previously disparate claims.  Thus, Putnam and Boyd are wrong to claim that realism is a “scientific explanation.”  

4.2.  Realism generates no new predictions
Realism generates no new empirical predictions over and above those already made by the claim that mature scientific theories are empirically successful—just as postulating a virtus dormativa does not make any new predictions over and above those already made by the claim that opium makes people sleepy.  Quantum electrodynamics makes certain experimental predictions, but adding ‘QED is approximately true (and not merely empirically adequate)’ to the standard formulation of QED will not yield any new predictions.  Similarly, adding the thesis of scientific realism to the conjunction of all our mature scientific theories (whichever those may be) does not generate any novel predictions either, over and above the predictions already made by adding the generalization ‘Mature scientific theories are empirically successful.’  Doppelt makes this point as well:
explanationists do not use a novel-prediction standard in giving their own naturalistic justification of scientific realism. Psillos and other explanationists clearly assume that the ability of… scientific realism, properly formulated, instantaneously to explain already well-known phenomena—the success of science—can confirm it and make it empirically successful, independently of novel prediction. (2005, 1080)
It is widely held that epistemic force accrues to particular scientific theories, in part, because they make novel predictions that are borne out.  The thesis of scientific realism found in the NMA apparently enjoys no such probative force.
	A realist might urge that her position does generate novel predictions:​[12]​ specifically, realism explains why novel uses or extensions of existing theories are empirically successful, a fact that is supposedly not otherwise predicted (for a well-developed articulation of this realist view, see (Leplin 1997)).​[13]​  But this view seems unfair to the opponent of realism.  The anti-realist can endorse the explanandum of the NMA, ‘Mature sciences are empirically successful.’  This sentence obviously does not have the same meaning as ‘Mature sciences are empirically successful in non-novel applications.’  But the realist could make a prediction that the anti-realist could not only if the anti-realist were committed merely to the latter and not the former.  For ‘Mature scientific theories are empirically successful,’ which an anti-realist accepts, presumably predicts that novel extensions of a theory, being themselves (parts of) theories, will also be empirically successful.  Thus, the realist hypothesis does not make a prediction that is not already made by ‘Mature sciences are empirically successful.’  
In response, the realist might say: ‘Let’s modify the NMA.  Change the explanandum to “Mature scientific theories have been empirically successful in previously encountered cases.”  I now take this as my original justification or ‘inductive base’ for believing that mature theories are approximately true.  Then, adding this realist hypothesis to my sum total of beliefs generates a new prediction over and above the explanandum, namely: novel, future extensions of mature theories will also be empirically successful.’  This response is problematic, however.  Consider the analogous case being made for virtus dormativa: imagine Molière’s doctor says that the original justification for ‘Opium makes people sleepy’ is that it has made a certain list of people sleepy; from this pattern, he infers a virtus dormativa.  Then the doctor makes the following prediction, based on his postulate of a virtus dormativa: when further people, not on the original list of opium-takers, are exposed to opium, they will also become sleepy.  Then, when this prediction is borne out, he counts that as evidence of a dormative virtue.  However, most would agree that Molière’s doctor does not have further evidence for his virtus dormativa hypothesis—rather, this is simply more evidence for the generalization that opium makes people sleepy.  The defense of scientific realism currently under consideration appears relevantly similar; thus, when novel predictions are borne out, this should be taken as evidence for the generalization that mature scientific theories are empirically successful (perhaps adding: ‘and not only for the phenomena they were originally introduced to explain’).  Put otherwise: all of these supposedly novel​[14]​ predictions that the realist makes can also be made without appeal to theories’ approximate truth, by instead merely appealing to ‘Mature scientific theories are approximately true.’
Finally, as referees suggested to me, one might hold that realism makes a prediction about the historical record of scientific development.  Realists hold that empirical success is a sign of truth.  Supposing that the realists are correct, and theories that enjoy a great deal of empirical success are usually​[15]​ approximately true, what would the historical record of scientific development then look like?  It is not obvious that this should predict anything about the course of scientific history.  However, a realist may suggest that if realism is correct, we would expect to see empirically successful theories replaced by radically different alternatives only very rarely (rare replacements must be allowed, since everyone is a fallibilist).  To reach that prediction (Most empirically successful theories are not replaced by radical rivals) as a conclusion from the original premise (Most empirically successful theories are approximately true), we need an additional premise; namely, that approximately true theories (once found) are not replaced by radically different rivals.  
Unfortunately, there are a number of problems with the realist’s generation of this prediction.  First, there are questions of operationalization: how do we count historical theories?  And how rare, exactly, must radical replacement be for the historical record to count as evidence for realism?  Let us set those questions aside (in part because they apply to anyone who wants cites the historical record as evidence, such as the anti-realist who appeals to the pessimistic induction).  Second, the argument we used to generate the prediction either has a premise that is most likely false, or the conclusion does not follow (even inductively).  If the additional premise we supplied in order to make the prediction is understood to be the exceptionless ‘All approximately true theories (once found) are not replaced by radically different rivals,’ then the conclusion follows, but this premise is very likely false—it is highly improbable that humans never give up an approximately true theory once they find it.  However, if we weaken the added premise to ‘Most approximately true theories (once found) are not replaced by radically different rivals’ (which might be true), then we no longer have an acceptable inductive argument form, since  
Most A are B 
Most B are C	
 Most A are C 
is not a legitimate inductive argument pattern.​[16]​  Finally, even if this problem could be overcome, and realism somehow managed to make a definite prediction to the effect that massive theoretical upheavals are relatively rare, it is not clear that this is a new prediction, i.e. one that is not also generated by other commonly-held beliefs about science shared by realist and anti-realist alike.  In particular, scientific development is recognized to favor, in general, more conservative changes over more radical ones.  That is, when a theory must be modified, and two possible modifications that would both save the phenomena are available, the modification that yields the smaller theoretical change is chosen, ceteris paribus.  This can explain the (purported) relative scarcity of massive upheavals in the historical record, without appealing to the more contentious realist claim that empirically successful theories are approximately true.  In sum, it is not clear that realism can make a prediction about the historical record, and even if it can, it is not a new prediction, since the prediction can be made from other widely accepted claims about scientific theory choice.

4.3.  Realism fails to unify disparate claims
Even if scientific realism did not generate any new predictions, might it nonetheless be an acceptable explanation, on the grounds that it unifies previously disparate claims, just as Newton’s law of universal gravitation unifies patterns in terrestrial free fall, the paths of planets and comets, and tidal behavior?  I believe the answer is no: realism, as it occurs in the NMA, is an explanation of only one pattern, viz. the ‘overall empirical success of mature sciences.’​[17]​  The proponent of the NMA might object to this last claim as follows: scientific realism unifies the empirical success of particle physics with the empirical success of evolutionary biology, organic chemistry, and so on.  Thus, the objector continues, scientific realism does rest on different sources of evidence, so the NMA is not akin to the objectionable kinds of explanations scientists are unwilling to accept.  However, this apparent unification is spurious: it is analogous to a vitalist claiming that because sea urchins, water hydrae, and other organisms can all develop into more mature forms despite certain perturbations in their early embryonic stages, positing an entelechy for each organism provides a unified account for these regularities. As discussed earlier, the fact that several organisms exhibit this developmental regularity may well provide evidence for the inductive generalization that all organisms exhibit similar regularities.  However, the fact that many organisms can survive such perturbations does not provide evidence that there is a specific entelechy in each species, responsible for this ability.  Again, Opium makes John sleepy and Opium makes Jane sleepy are already unified by the fact that opium makes people sleepy; positing a dormative virtue in addition to explain the inductive generalization achieves no further unification.  The analogy with the NMA should be clear: the empirical successes of general relativity, organic chemistry, and evolutionary biology provide evidence for the inductive generalization All mature sciences are empirically successful, but any substantive ‘unifying work’ is done at the level of this inductive generalization, which is the explanandum of scientific realism.  No further unification is achieved by additionally claiming ‘These mature sciences are (approximately) true.’
	The defender of the NMA can make a second, related objection to my argument.  The NMA advocate notes that (P1)-(P3) of my argument are compatible with the existence of acceptable abductive inferences in particular scientific disciplines, and points out that scientists make proper abductive inferences to the existence of electrons and their properties, the existence of the weak force and its properties, etc.  For present purposes, I am willing to grant this.  Suppose, the objector continues, that we simply form a giant conjunction of the conclusions of each of these proper abductive inferences: ‘Electrons exist, have rest mass of 9.1066  10-28 g, have charge of -1.602  10-19 coulombs, … [whatever other properties our best theory attributes to them], and DNA is a double helix, composed of four types of nucleotides arranged on a sugar and phosphate backbone, where Adenine and Thymine are always paired, and Cytosine and Guanine are always paired, and … [whatever other properties our best theory attributes to DNA], and …[all the rest of the contents of current mature scientific theories]’.  Call this sentence the giant conjunction.  Now, one might think the NMA is defensible, if ‘Mature sciences are (approximately) true’ means nothing more than the giant conjunction—though it is far from clear that the giant conjunction is what many scientific realists intend their thesis to mean (see next paragraph).  However, this response runs into a thicket of problems involving intertheoretic relationships among the various sciences: the conjuncts of the giant conjunction will include the claims of both quantum mechanics and general relativity, and the compatibility of these two theories is dubious at best (Barrett 2003).  Similar sorts of problems appear elsewhere: there is substantive empirical evidence that the concept of a gene varies widely among the sub-disciplines of the biological sciences (e.g., Stotz et al. 2004).  The upshot of this is that the NMA proponent’s objection only holds water if all our mature scientific theories are compatible.  I grant that this is certainly a possibility, but there are strong indications (in addition to the two just cited) that our sciences exhibit significant disunity.  In response to such strong disunity, a defender of the NMA could conceivably lean on the qualifier ‘approximately’ that appears in the statement of realism, and suggest that inconsistent theories might nonetheless be approximately true, though not true simpliciter.  If we set aside the problems faced by the notion of approximate truth (Miller 1974), perhaps a sufficiently ingenious account of inconsistency in scientific theories can save this proposal.  However, it stretches credulity to accept that a contradictory sentence can be even approximately true.​[18]​  At least, I would sooner give up scientific realism than accept that a contradiction can approximate the truth.
	Finally, for the sake of argument, let us bracket the above worry about the disunity of the sciences, and suppose that our sciences (or the portions of our sciences that the NMA-defender wishes to endorse) are consistent.  What would the ‘giant conjunction’ form of the NMA look like then?  I think there are at least two options: the fact being explained is either just a giant conjunction of all the predictions of the various theories, or (as before) the empirical success of mature scientific theories.  On option 1, the first premise will take the form ‘General relativity is the best explanation of gravitational lensing, the precession of Mercury’s perihelion, and… [all the other phenomena general relativity purports to explain], and the theory of evolution via common descent is the best explanation of homologies, the fossil record, and …, and quantum mechanics is the best explanation of the results of the double-slit experiment, the observed violation of Bell’s inequalities, and …, and…’​[19]​  The second premise will consist of descriptions of gravitational lensing etc., and of homologies etc., and of the double-slit experiment etc., and…  The conclusion will be descriptions of quantum mechanics, and general relativity, and evolution by natural selection, and…  
	Now it is clear that such an argument is a ‘mere conjunction’ of the individual abductive inferences used in the particular sciences, so there is no substantive unification here, and furthermore no argument for any sort of ‘global’ realism.  In the context of the NMA, these individual abductive inferences have been called ‘first-order’ inferences to the best explanation.  Certain philosophers who find value in the NMA are only concerned to defend first-order instances of IBE (for example, (Worrall 1989)).  However, many proponents of the NMA want to push a ‘second-order’ IBE: the success of the first-order inferential practice is best explained by the fact that our scientific practices usually deliver (approximate) truth.  Psillos clearly falls into the second camp:
NMA is not just a generalization over scientists’ abductive inferences. … The (first-order) instances of explanatory reasoning involve the claim that it is reasonable to accept that particular theories [e.g. general relativity or quantum mechanics] are relevantly approximately true.  …  NMA is a kind of meta-abduction.  The explanandum of the NMA is a general feature of scientific methodology—its reliability for yielding correct predictions. (1999, 79)
So, using this terminology, this first version of the giant-conjunction NMA is simply a conjunction of all the first-order abductive inferences.  The considerations presented in Section 2, concerning the kinds of explanations scientists are unwilling to accept, would not affect this sort of NMA.  But many realists endorse Psillos’ global conception of realism; the giant-conjunction NMA as described above simply does not capture their view, so they cannot appeal to it in response to the argument presented here.
	Could there be a giant-conjunction version of the NMA that does do justice to global realism?  This is the second option mentioned above.  The first premise would be ‘General relativity and quantum mechanics and evolution by natural selection and… best explain the empirical success of science.’  The second premise would then be, as in the original formulation of the NMA, ‘Mature sciences are empirically successful.’  This certainly better captures the kind of global realism Psillos espouses.  However, the first premise is probably false: the general theory of relativity does not explain why scientific theories reliably yield correct predictions; rather, it explains gravitational lensing phenomena and the precession in the perihelion of Mercury.  Similarly, quantum mechanics explains the results of the two-slit experiment, not the empirical success of scientific theorizing.  
	In sum, the giant-conjunction defense of NMA does not withstand scrutiny, since it suffers from one or more of the following problems (depending on how the defense is construed).  The giant-conjunction defense (i) founders on the disunity of science (since the disjunction would likely be inconsistent), or (ii) fails to capture the ‘global’ or second-order character of the realist thesis NMA is often invoked to justify, or finally (iii) contains a false premise, since particular sciences, taken in isolation or together, do not explain why scientific methodology so often generates correct predictions.  Thus, scientific realism explains the empirical success of science no better than a virtus dormativa explains the soporific effects of opium.

5. Conclusion: relation to the wider scientific realism debate.  Finally, I would like to situate the complaint lodged here against the NMA within the larger landscape of debates over scientific realism.  The thrust of my argument appears to fit most naturally with Arthur Fine’s ‘Natural Ontological Attitude’ position in the realism debates (Fine 1986), for (P1)-(P3) attempts to justify a kind of quietism about one version of the scientific realism debate, via appeal to actual scientific practices of explanation.  The advantage of the above argument for the NOAer is that it provides a criterion for exactly when one should be a quietist, based on scientific practice.  However, even if the argument presented here is granted in its entirety, there are other species of scientific realism that will survive unscathed.  For example, the axiological characterization of scientific realism is that science aims at the truth, instead of scientific theories simply being (approximately) true (van Fraassen 1980).  Science could certainly aim at the truth without being approximately true most of the time, so (P1)-(P3) carry no force against such a version of realism.  Peter Achinstein has recently defended a second version of scientific realism that could also escape the present argument: unobservable entities exist (Achinstein 2002).  Philip Kitcher’s ‘Real Realism’ (and its kin) most likely escapes the above argument as well, for it attempts to vindicate the reliability of the inference from empirical success (of a specified sort) to truth directly, instead of via some form of IBE (2001).  Finally, David Harker has recently attempted to formulate a version of selective realism explicitly designed to generate predictions (Harker 2008).  The fact that such a variety of positions in the realism debate are left untouched by my argument shows that while the position articulated here could be used to underwrite the quietism of Fine’s NOA, it need not be used toward that end.  In fact, a scientific realist who accepted these other conceptions of realism could appeal to my argument to eliminate competing, global IBE-based versions of realism.
	Furthermore, the argument presented here does not even force someone committed to the version of realism discussed above to relinquish that version of realism.  Such a realist could instead view the above argument as a reductio of the version of naturalism used here, which restricts philosophical methods to scientific methods.  For NMA proponents who feel the force of the present argument, this may be the most appealing response.  After all, there is some sense prima facie that philosophy and science are different enterprises: the questions asked and approaches used in the pages of The Journal of Philosophy seem different from those found in Nature and Science, even if it is difficult to articulate those differences precisely.  A realist need not give up on naturalism entirely, for there are other versions that would not fall prey to the central argument here.  For example, one might suggest that a naturalist need only be committed to the claim that empirical science and philosophy are, in some sense, continuous: just as blue and green lie on a continuum, yet are nonetheless different colors, perhaps science and philosophy blend imperceptibly into one another, without their methods of inquiry being coextensive.  However, the notion that philosophy and science are continuous is a metaphor that should be explicated in a more precise way, if it is to do substantive philosophical work for the naturalist; in particular, if it is to excuse her from the charge that the no-miracles argument appeals to something akin to a virtus dormativa explanation, which philosophers as well as scientists reject.
	How does the present argument relate to the debates over the acceptability of inference to the best explanation?  Fine and van Fraassen have attacked arguments that appeal to IBE to defend scientific realism.  Fine’s primary complaint is that the realist’s appeal to abductive inference is circular, since an anti-realist challenges the claim that abductive inferences to (e.g.) the existence of quarks yield (approximate) truth (1991, 82).  Van Fraassen presents arguments that challenge the truth-conduciveness of IBE (1989, 142-146); elsewhere, he suggests that scientific uses of IBE could be fairly interpreted as generating claims that are merely empirically adequate, not true (1980, 71-72).  My complaint with the abductive reasoning employed in the NMA is distinct from these criticisms.  I have not attacked or defended IBE in general, or discussed whether its deployment in defense of realism is circular.  My claim is that there is a very specific kind of abductive inference that scientists do not accept—and that the NMA is an instance of that kind.​[20]​  This is closely related to another disagreement between realists and anti-realists that is apparently currently regarded as a stalemate: anti-realists are supposedly simply more willing to tolerate unexplained regularities than realists (McMullin 1994, 100), and this difference is merely a difference in personal proclivities or tastes—and thus not a matter for rational discussion.  I hope to have shown that we need not abandon this issue to de gustibus non disputandum est: virtually everyone is willing to tolerate some unexplained regularities until an acceptable explanation appears(for what are our fundamental laws of nature but unexplained regularities?).  The substantive questions are then: What is a scientifically acceptable explanation, and in particular, does some version of realism count meet that standard?  This need not be merely a matter of taste.
	Finally, one may wonder what relation the preceding bears to the vexed observable/ unobservable distinction, which has dominated the realism debate.  Clearly, many of the abductively inferred claims that scientists do not accept involve unobservable entities, such as Driesch’s entelechies.  However, if what I have claimed above is correct, such claims are not rejected on the grounds that they traffic in the unobservable.  The observable/ unobservable distinction is a morass, and threatens to be a more-or-less uninteresting morass at that.  I consider it an advantage of the above argument that it challenges realism without directly setting foot in the swamp of debates over the observable/ unobservable distinction, and shifts attention in the realism debate to the question of what counts as an acceptable scientific explanation.  I am certainly not the first to suggest this line of attack on scientific realism; we find it in The Scientific Image:
science, in contrast to scientific realism, does not place an overriding value on explanation in the absence of any gain for empirical results…the point is that the demand on science is not for explanation as such.  (van Fraassen 1980, 34)
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^1	  An exception is made for ‘self-evidencing’ explanations; see section 3.3.  This exception is innocuous, for reasons described below.
^2	  I have intentionally chosen ‘and’ here instead of ‘or.’  Although many scientists may well decline to accept an explanans that unifies without generating new testable predictions—as the recent disquiet over string theory demonstrates—I recognize that many will accept such an explanans.  However, virtually no one will accept an explanans that neither unifies nor generates new predictions.  
^3	  My view about where explanations end (in other words, which facts can be taken as ‘brute’) is similar to Craig Callender’s: “there is not some feature of facts that make them potentially acceptably brute or self-explanatory… We instead look at the theoretical system as a whole and see how it fares empirically… What we don’t want to do is posit substantive truths about the world a priori to meet some unmotivated explanatory demand—as Hegel did when he notoriously said there must be six planets in the solar system” (Callender 2004, 247-248).  Callender’s remark fits with my claim because adding to a ‘theoretical system’ a postulate that explains only one previously accepted calim would not generate a better theoretical system—and that is what sets a boundary for where explanations may end.
^4	  To forestall potential misunderstanding, note that I am not claiming that no acceptable explanation of the number of planets is possible; rather, I claiming that Kepler’s explanation is unacceptable.  Similar points hold for the other examples cited in support of (P1).
^5	  The opening sentence of Kepler’s Mysterium Cosmographicum reads: “the most great and good Creator, in the creation of this moving universe and the arrangement of the heavens, looked to those five regular solids… and He fitted to the nature of those solids, the number of the heavens, their proportions, and the law of their motions” (1596/ 1981, 63).
^6	  Kitcher (1981) provides an account of why certain apparent unifications based on theological principles do not genuinely unify: they fail the respect what he calls the desideratum of stringency.
^7	  For a recent, somewhat humorous example, see (Hsu and Zee, 2006).
^8	  I strongly suspect many other explanations offered by philosophers who identify themselves as naturalists also fit this bill.  But I will not explore any other applications here, confining my comments to a certain type of scientific realism. 
^9	  There are a variety of particular formulations of the NMA; see (Psillos 1999, 72-81).  Magnus and Callender (2004, 232), in their critique of the NMA, cast the argument in probabilistic, instead of explanatory, terms.  Thus, instead of the premise ‘The truth of mature scientific theories best explains their success,’ they substitute ‘The probability that a theory is true, given that it is empirically successful, is close to 1.’ The difference between explanatory considerations and probabilistic ones matters, if we accept (Lipton 1991)’s claim that IBE should be understood as inference to the loveliest explanation, not the likeliest one.  Magnus and Callender (2004) do not cite any proponents of the NMA who explicitly endorse the probabilistic version of the argument; however, Magnus suggested to me (personal communication) that Philip Kitcher’s ‘Real Realism’ (2001) may fit this description.
^10	  Working out the details of how best to characterize empirical success is difficult, but fortunately immaterial for present purposes.  For details, see (Forster, 2007).
^11	  I must thank an anonymous referee who stressed the significance of this point.
^12	  The ambiguity between use-novelty and temporal novelty here is intentional; these remarks are intended to apply to both.
^13	  I thank two anonymous referees for raising this issue—one directly, one indirectly.  Additionally, Leplin’s view (as I understand it) is meant to apply to what I later call ‘first-order’ abductive arguments for realism.    
^14	  On Leplin’s (1997) account of novelty, these realist predictions would not count as novel: for Leplin, a novel prediction must be unique in the sense that cannot be generated from another available theory; in the present case, ‘Mature scientific theories are empirically successful’ would also make these predictions.
^15	  If ‘usually’ were omitted, then realism would be immediately falsified (and thus make a prediction), since virtually everyone agrees that at least some major scientific revolutions involve empirically successful theories turning out to be not approximately true.  
^16	  To see this, let A be ‘professors,’ B ‘people over 30 years old,’ and C ‘non-professors’
^17	  John Worrall foreshadowed this claim: “there is surely a crucial, pragmatic difference between a good scientific explanation, and the ‘explanation’ afforded by the thesis of realism for the success of our present theories.  A requirement for a convincing scientific explanation is independent testability….  Yet in the case of realism’s ‘explanation’ of the success of our current theories there can of course be no question of any independent tests” (1989, 102).  I do not understand why Worrall considers this difference pragmatic rather than epistemic; with that caveat, this section can be viewed as, in part, an elaboration and defense of Worrall’s brief (and underappreciated) remarks.
^18	  This is especially clear if the logic at issue is classical, since then every sentence follows from a contradiction.  However, if the contradiction can be ‘quarantined’ (e.g. by using a paraconsistent logic), and this contradiction is part of a much larger conjunction all of whose conjuncts (except the contradiction) are true, then perhaps we might consider counting the whole conjunction approximately true. 
^19	  Alternatively, the premise could take the form ‘General relativity and evolution by common descent and quantum mechanics and… all together best explain gravitational lensing, the precession of Mercury’s perihelion, etc., and homologies, the fossil record, etc. and the results of the two-slit experiment etc.’.  Although this alternative formulation is not logically equivalent to the original one, I can see no important differences between the two.
^20	  Peter Lipton’s view of the relationship between scientific realism and the NMA (which he calls the ‘Truth Argument’) is similar to mine, though he takes a different route to that conclusion.  Lipton conceives of IBE in general as ‘inference to the loveliest explanation,’ and argues that the NMA “is not lovely at all” (1991, 172).  However, his rationale stems from a concern that the NMA would work equally well for any incompatible theories that generate the same observable predictions: “A very complex and ad hoc theory provides less lovely explanations than does a simple and unified theory of the same phenomena, but the truth of the complex theory is as lovely or ugly an explanation of the truth of its predictions as is the explanation that the truth of the simple theory provides” (1991, 173).
